Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
Liberia as well as other parts of West Africa. This paper will argue that ECOWAS and the transitional Liberian government must be soundly integrated into the UN Mission in Liberia's (UNMIL) security and nation building efforts and must further be capable of exploiting UNMIL's success with law enforcement, peace and stability operations as well as good governance to ensure Liberia's ultimate long term success. The ECOWAS's active involvement is critical to the future of this country.
The ECOWAS initially entered Liberia in 1990 . They were responding to a brutal civil war which erupted a year earlier and would last another seven years pitting tribe against tribe and leading to the death of more than 200,000 Liberians. 2 The ECOWAS made a valiant effort to end the violence but were unsuccessful in controlling the warlords and the fighting.
In 1997, following several years of mayhem, Charles Taylor, the leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) was fairly elected President of Liberia. 3 Taylor's' win was a cry by the Liberian people for peace, new leadership, law and order. Liberia saw a brief respite in the ongoing civil war while they were mislead into an even briefer period of hope under the Taylor regime. It soon became clear that the Taylor government was just as corrupt as the previous regime and not only condoned the violence but engaged in criminal activity themselves. The ECOWAS, obliged to continue their efforts, remained until 1999, but once again, their efforts at intervention and disarmament failed despite their good intentions. The ECOWAS simply did not have the political savvy, the financial ability, or leadership skills to make a successful, lasting impact on the peace process. 4 The UN's involvement prior to Taylor's election was limited to oversight of the ECOWAS efforts in an observer capacity. Finally, in September 2003, and with U.S. urging, The United Nations (UN) authorized a peacekeeping operation, The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to intervene and provide the critical security and administrative framework to support the political transition, relief effort, rehabilitation and reconstruction in Liberia. 5 The UN's involvement was a welcomed relief and gave the citizens of Liberia a reason to believe in a future of peace and stability. This paper provides an overview of the background leading to the fall of Liberia, the current peace agreement, the UN mandate and international support, and the role of the U.S. in support of the peace effort. In addition, it addresses the role ECOWAS, the future Liberian government, and nongovernmental organizations must play in order to restore law and order and secure peace and nation building for the future.
The UNMIL has taken the lead to disarm combatants, enforce peace and establish security. The ECOWAS and a new Liberian government must be trained and enabled to exploit the UNMIL's success with building and maintaining legitimate security and police forces, and enforcing the rule of law. The ECOWAS's long term involvement is without question, Liberia's best chance for stability in the country and region.
INTRODUCTION
The prospect for peace in Liberia has taken on wings and is closer than it has been in over a decade. The UN and international community are committed to bringing security and democracy to this shattered nation, while creating conditions for reform. 6 Current world events, regional instability and crisis, as well as the global war on terrorism make it unlikely that the contributing countries to the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), despite good intentions, can afford to, or will commit troops to the security and nation building effort for more than the 12 months authorized by the UN. In fact, many countries may not be able to withstand even a short term troop commitment. Their failure to support the UN mission may force the ECOWAS and a new Liberian government which may still be in the infancy stages of nation building, to take responsibility should the UN footprint be reduced either short term or in the latter years. In addition, political and economic reconstruction depends on how quickly security can spread throughout the country and law and order can be restored. These and many other factors make it critical for the United Nations to create conditions to ensure the ECOWAS is capable and able to sustain UN efforts in future years and have the ability and capability to sustain conditions for Liberia's ultimate long term success.
BACKGROUND
Africa is the world's poorest continent and continues to have a sizable population of uneducated and disparate poor people. The West African region is among the most unstable and contributes to the overall economic devastation of the continent. The sub-region is dominated by young people, most of whom lack education, technical skills, and the general prerequisites to function effectively in a modern economy. 7 West Africa has been plagued with civil wars, famine and destruction over many years and is home to skilled militia members and criminals. Many of these criminals, to include child soldiers, commit these deviant acts to survive in an economy that offers little alternative. As a result, the West African security environment is viewed as one of the most complex of all the regions in the world and is further compounded by the multi-ethnic nature of the states. Without exception, all of the states in West Africa are a forced amalgamation of different nationalities, some with opposing cultural value systems put together at the turn of the century by France, the UK, Portugal and Germany for their own administrative and economic convenience. 8 Shifting affiliations and unique tribal characteristics, in addition to a long history of corruption, crime, and mismanagement by previous governments, starvation, economic devastation, lack of education and opportunity, and violence are all prevalent destabilizers in the region.
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Liberia is a small country in the region with a population of about 2.5 million people. It was established in the early 1800s by freed American slaves. Its name ironically stands for "Liberty" and although they have long standing historical and cultural ties with the U.S., they were never ruled from Washington the way most other African countries were ruled by colonial powers.
Today, over 80 percent of the population in Liberia is unemployed, 74 percent of the population has no access to safe drinking water and 60 percent have no access to sanitary facilities. In addition, 42 percent of the population is considered undernourished and the life expectancy is a mere 48 years of age. 10 Liberia's recent decline can be attributed to the 14 year civil war which has had a devastating effect on the people, the land and their future. 
FORMER PRESIDENT CHARLES TAYLOR

THE WARRING FACTIONS
The fighting, brutality, and corruption between the rival warring factions slowed down briefly, but soon escalated to pre-Taylor conditions. Two distinct rivals came to power against Taylor's government, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), a breakaway group from Charles Taylor's' National Pacific Liberation Front, and the Movement for Democracy of Liberia (MODEL). Both groups had strong ties to one or more neighboring states and both were determined to take control of the Liberian government. Estimates of the number of pro-Taylor units range from 7,000 to 11,000. Another figure shows between 20,000 and 30,000 militias closely aligned to Taylor. 17 The LURD core force is reported to have consisted of about 3,000 fighters but picked up an unknown number of new recruits as it was enroute from its bases in Guinea to Monrovia during the early months of 2003.
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Charles Taylor, despite his initial political rhetoric had become a brutal oppressive leader and once again found himself at the center of a bloody civil war. Under Taylor's watch the economy and infrastructure was further destroyed and the Liberian people were unable to recover without more war, crime, and corruption or the more desirable option, intervention from the international community.
ECOMOG remained actively engaged in peacekeeping, but like most multinational peace support forces, experienced challenges. The difficulties included trying to operate a unified command when there was high level distrust among member states as well as influence from non-regional powers. In addition, troop contingents would on occasion arrive in the mission area with different and sometimes conflicting instructions. 19 Logistics were also problematic as each country provided its own contingent with arms, ammunition, food, transportation and communication equipment. Nigeria however, took the lead and provided the entire force with petroleum, oil and lubricants. 20 Other challenges included language differences, inadequate resources to deal with humanitarian problems and poor coordination and liaison with international relief agencies.
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U.S. INTERVENTION
In 2003, the United States and the international community were bombarded with media coverage of the escalation in rebel fighting and the atrocities being committed upon the innocent. It was also obvious that the ECOWAS, despite its best efforts would not be able to successfully enforce the original disarmament efforts and reverse the destructive cycle of violence without additional intervention. As the devastation persisted, the Bush Administration took a firm and very public stand in support of the West African peace effort. President Bush offered U.S. assistance under strict conditions. Those conditions included; the departure of Charles Taylor from office and Liberia; a cease-fire between rebel groups and the Liberian government forces; and the firm commitment by West African countries to provide leadership and the bulk of the troops for any further peacekeeping effort. 22 Charles Taylor succumbed to the pressure from the U.S. and the international community and reluctantly agreed to step down and leave the country. Taylor, who had prevented the peace process from taking hold in the past, had finally run out of options. His removal was non-negotiable, and eventually opened the door for the international community to respond in kind.
The U.S. led the way with a Joint Task Force of approximately 200 military personnel assigned for four primary purposes, 1) to assess the readiness of the combined ECOWAS forces, 2) to assist with training the forces if required, 3) to assist with the ECOWAS objective of achieving security and stability in the region, and 4) to provide a reaction force capability if the ECOWAS got into trouble before reinforcement arrived. The U.S. positioned a Marine element at the airport and embedded them as liaisons to serve with other elements moving to ports. The overall objective was to create conditions for ECOWAS forces to enter Liberia and eventually turn control over to the United Nations peacekeeping operation. 40 One such success is the signing of the Accra Peace Accord which is now being enforced by the UNMIL in Liberia.
THE ACCRA PEACE ACCORD
The Accra Peace Accord marks one of the most significant times in Liberia's long and difficult journey for peace. It provides an unprecedented opportunity to begin the healing and reconciliation process. The agreement named after the location of its signing in Accra, Ghana, was signed on 18 August 2003, by the Government of Liberia (GoL) formerly Taylor's NPFL, the other rebel groups, political parties and leaders of Liberia's civil society. 41 The signing of this Unfortunately, he is at a major disadvantage due to the slow arrival of peacekeepers and police. Britain, the United States, Lebanon, Ghana, China, and the European Union attended the briefing and followed it up with field visits to internally displaced camps in Monrovia. This briefing was a call for action from the international community and donor countries and an opportunity to brief them on the political and security developments as well as the reconstruction and humanitarian challenges ahead. 49 A number of countries have begun sending forces to support the mission, but many more are still needed.
The people of Liberia have high hopes that UNMIL will enforce peace. The United Nations however, will need to ensure that it does not make costly mistakes, referring of course to the to United Nations observer mission in the 1990s that failed partly because of poor disarmament. 50 If SRGS Klein and his team can deliver a more sustainable disarmament process ahead of the October 2005 elections, that will be a critical first step.
The international communities' troop commitment cannot be guaranteed through 2005; as a result the more immediate tasks must be aggressively pursued in the short term. The immediate tasks involve security on the ground; putting in place a new government, and extending its authority throughout the country, establishing the rule of law as well as humanitarian aid.
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As security and stability are achieved, ECOWAS must be able to retain the current advantages made under the UNMIL. They must have the capability to conduct military and civil policing operations following the UNMIL's troop departure. To do that they will require the skills, training, funding, logistical support and competent leadership. The U.S. is major contributor to that effort. his Africa Policy that "Africa's great size and diversity requires a security strategy that focuses on bilateral engagement and builds coalitions of the willing." 53 He further states that strengthening sub-regional organizations on a sustained basis is a primary means to address transnational threats. This strategy suggests continued support for legitimate regional organizations such as ECOWAS who are striving to bring peace to Liberia. The Bush African
U.S. SECURITY STRATEGY AND INTERESTS
Liberia no longer dominates the headlines as it did in
Policy includes the following three pillars:
1) The strategic approach: work with key anchor states in each sub-region, support sub-regional organizations and engage the African Union; 2) clear policy priorities: combat HIV/AIDS pandemic, advance political and economic freedom and promote peace and regional stability and 3) principles of bilateral engagement: good governance, economic reform, promote health and education.
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All of these policies in varying degrees support previous and ongoing efforts in Liberia and should significantly impact its long term recovery. Lastly, the National Security Strategy (NSS)
addresses the values based interests of championing aspirations of human dignity.
Senator Warner, one of the longest serving Republican Senators told journalists that the United States considers peace to Liberia to be a vital interest, and that the President recognizes the bond of friendship between the two countries. "Promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war and desperate poverty in Africa. This threatens both a core value of the United Statespreserving human dignity-and our strategic priority-combating global terrorism. American interests and American principles, therefore, lead in the same direction; we will work with others for an African continent that lives in liberty, peace and growing prosperity.
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This position by the administration has resulted in intervention against matters threatening human dignity and will continue to manifest itself in the many roles and missions taken on by the United States and the international community. 
U.S. GOVERNMENT/MILITARY PROGRAMS
LONG TERM COMMITMENT
The road to recovery in Liberia will be a long one. The UN is the right vehicle to manage this difficult and challenging regional security environment and must continue to do so with the ultimate goal of transferring authority and responsibility back to ECOWAS and the newly elected government for long term stabilization.
The Security Council will, following the 12 month transitional phase, vote to determine the level of long term support authorized and required beyond the original commitment.
Unfortunately, a protracted, lengthier commitment may not be supportable given the national priorities of many member states, the national security environment, and the global war on terrorism. Countries have failed to fully support the initial commitment as evidenced by the fact that less than one half of the required 15,000 forces on the ground in country to date. SRGS Klein has expressed frustration in that "most of Europe" is going instead to Afghanistan and Iraq. He notes that one European country had earmarked 1,000 troops for Liberia, until the U.S.
requested they be deployed to Afghanistan instead. 60 These types of troop deployment decisions may become more common in the future. Clearly, threat-based interests such as the global war on terrorism may require additional, unplanned resources from the U.S. and the international community. The future of these operations and our subsequent requirement to support them is difficult to project, but may have a clear impact on the level of support and number of troops the international community is capable of providing to humanitarian missions such as Liberia, in the future.
The UN troop presence may also be reduced as current efforts in Liberia become successful. ECOWAS must therefore be prepared to exploit all successes achieved in Liberia.
While they have faced challenges such as poorly trained and equipped armies and poor sustainment capabilities, it is clear that they will need the short and long term financial support of the U.S. as well as the short term intervention and presence of UN forces to help provide security and help ECOWAS transition to an effective long term stabilizing force. Fortunately, ECOWAS forces are committed to the pursuit of security, stability and peace and recognize that with the help of the international community they can overcome many of the personnel and logistical challenges they faced when they operated independently. The UN mandate and subsequent intervention undoubtedly offers the best opportunity for Liberia to become a normal functioning state. The prevailing view by members of the UNMIL is that the LURD and MODEL will surrender arms and seek peace as they no longer have a motive to fight. 63 The U.S. and the International community must however, continually conduct combined and joint exercises, provide support as well as reinforcement training and evaluation to determine the capabilities and readiness of the ECOWAS and Liberian forces. With an ambiguous U.S. and international agenda, the uncertain global security environment and the global war on terrorism, it is more important than ever that regional organizations lead from the front. ECOWAS must position themselves for long term success by preparing to handle the bulk of the security and peacekeeping missions and nation building objectives to create conditions for the economic and diplomatic and informational instruments of power to succeed. Recovery is clearly long term but possible, just look at their neighbors in Senegal, Zimbabwe and South Africa. WORD COUNT=5985
